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WE HAVE SEEN THE ENEMY: SCENES FROM
A TRIAL
Robert E. Precht*
Introduction
Prosecutors - like all people - are prone to making bad
decisions.
Discussing decision-making in the Harvard Business Review, au-
thors Hammond, Keeney, and Raiffa identify a number of mental
traps people often encounter when making decisions.' For exam-
ple, decision-makers tend to seek out information that verifies
their prejudices, even given evidence to the contrary.2 Moreover,
decision-makers often give excessive credence to the first bit of in-
formation that they learn, anchoring all subsequent interpretation
to this early knowledge. Such tendencies result in bad decisions.4
What makes these pitfalls so distressing is that they seem to be a
natural part of the human thought process.5 Because these traps
are ingrained in the way the mind works, they are difficult to de-
tect.6 Ultimately, in order to compensate for these misjudgments,
the human actor must build disciplines into the decision-making
process.7 Only with such structured care can the decision-maker
detect and rectify the problems caused by inaccurate assumptions.8
For prosecutors, who have a substantial decision-making role
within the criminal justice system, the psychological traps are espe-
* Director, Office of Public Service, University of Michigan Law School; Associ-
ate Trial Counsel, Federal Defender Division, The Legal Aid Society 1989-1995; Asso-
ciate Appellate Counsel, Federal Defender Services Unit, The Legal Aid Society
1986-1989. I extend my appreciation to Steve Blanchard, Jonathan Franklin, Samuel
Gross, Susan Guindi, Stephen Hiyama, Jerry Lynch, Kelly O'Donnell, Chris Serkin,
David Wasserman and Sarah Zearfoss for their perceptive comments and suggestions
on earlier drafts.
1. John S. Hammond et al., The Hidden Traps in Decision Making, HARV. Bus.
REV. (Sept.-Oct. 1998), 47, 52. Identifying a number of traps, the authors believe that
the mind can unconsciously sabotage decisions. See id. at 47. I have borrowed heav-
ily from their analysis.
2. See id. at 52.
3. See id. at 48.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 47.
6. See id. at 50.
7. See id. at 58.
8. See id.
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cially dangerous. These traps can undermine everything from guilt
determination to credibility judgments to plea negotiations.
This Article examines two traps that are particularly likely to un-
dermine prosecutorial decision-making - the confirming-evidence
trap and the anchoring trap.9 During the World Trade Center
bombing trial, 10 at which the author served as defense counsel,
prosecutors stumbled into both of these traps.
Part I of this Article examines the confirming-evidence trap in
the context of the prosecution's failure to accept contradictory evi-
dence regarding the material used in the bomb. Part II similarly
examines the anchoring trap in light of the debacle that occurred
during testimony by the prosecution's main witness. In addition to
examining these episodes, the Article concludes that prosecutors
need substantial trial experience to learn to avoid these tricks of
the mind, and plea-bargaining negotiations do not suffice in provid-
ing such experience. Unfortunately, as the trial rate in federal
courts drops, new prosecutors receive far less experience than their
predecessors did." Consequently, these crucial decision-makers in
the criminal justice system are doomed to make critical, albeit
avoidable, mistakes.
I. Confirming the Phantom Chemical Fingerprint
Five months into the World Trade Center bombing trial, there
was still a major gap in the government's case; investigators could
not identify the type of explosive used. Fred Whitehurst, the senior
chemist in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's ("FBI") renowned
crime laboratory, was scheduled to be the government's witness on
explosives. The day before he testified, a prosecutor handed de-
fense counsel a letter that Whitehurst had addressed to his superi-
ors. In the letter,. Whitehurst accused principal examiner David
Williams, the agent who summarized the scientific analysis and pre-
pared the laboratory's final report, of pressuring the crime labora-
tory to slant its findings to favor the prosecution.
Perhaps understandably, the prosecutor decided not to call
Whitehurst and instead summoned Steven Burmeister, White-
hurst's junior colleague and the laboratory's only other chemist. 2
Nevertheless, Burmeister admitted that it was impossible to iden-
9. Id. at 48, 52.
10. United States v. Salameh et. al., No. S593 Cr. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
11. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
12. See Trial Transcript at 7081, Salameh, No. S593 Cr. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) [here-
inafter Trial Transcript].
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tify the contents of the bomb from the tire fragment they had ana-
lyzed.13 His admission made front-page news. 14
As unhelpful as that testimony was, Burmeister compounded it
by revealing further evidence of Williams' bias. Burmeister further
related how, immediately after the explosion, investigators sum-
moned Whitehurst and him to the blast scene in New York. Conse-
quently, no qualified chemists remained to perform explosives-
residue analysis at the laboratory in Washington where investiga-
tors had sent the tire fragment for analysis. Thus, non-specialists in
the Chemistry-Toxicology Unit tested the tire and concluded that
urea nitrate was detected on the specimen.1 5 This conclusion
helped the prosecution because it tended to establish that the
World Trade Center bomb contained urea nitrate, a rare substance
that matched chemical residues found at locations linked to the de-
fendant. Williams approved the dictation and included it in his of-
ficial report.1 6
When Whitehurst and Burmeister returned to Washington, they
realized that the non-specialists had misinterpreted instrumental
readings, which only showed the presence of urea and nitric acid.
Cognizant of the fact that these substances could have originated
from any number of non-incriminating substances such as urine,
fertilizer, car exhaust, or antifreeze, the two pleaded with Williams
and asked him to amend the report. 7 He refused.'i Laboratory
mangers subsequently rebuffed Whitehurst and Burmeister's ap-
peals, but permitted the two to test the tire fragment themselves.19
They told Williams the results were consistent with the presence of
urea and nitric acid, but they cautioned that materials other than
urea nitrate could have produced the same results. 20 Williams con-
13. See id.
14. See Richard Bernstein, Chemist Can't Pinpoint Bomb Contents at Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1994, at B3.
15. See Michael R. Bromwich, Inspector General, The FBI Laboratory: An Inves-
tigation into Laboratory Practices and Alleged Misconduct in Explosives-Related and
Other Cases (April 1997) (visited Feb. 20, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/fbilabl/
fbilltoc.htm> [hereinafter Bromwich, Investigation].
16. See Bromwich, Investigation, supra note 15, at 50-51; see also Trial Transcript,
supra note 12, at 7085-7105.
17. See Bromwich, Investigation, supra note 15, at 50-51; see also Trial Transcript,
supra note 12, at 7085-7105.
18. See Bromwich, Investigation, supra note 15, at 50-51; see also Trial Transcript,
supra note 12, at 7085-7105.
19. See Bromwich, Investigation, supra note 15, at 50-51; see also Trial Transcript,
supra note 12, at 7085-7105.
20. See Bromwich, Investigation, supra note 15, at 50-51; see also Trial Transcript,
supra note 12, at 7085-7105.
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tinued to resist adopting the full conclusions of: the scientists. 21 Af-
ter receiving the new findings, he grudgingly agreed to amend the
earlier report, but he also asked Whitehurst's unit chief to remove
the caveat that innocent substances could have produced the same
results. 22 The unit chief refused, after which Williams unsuccess-
fully appealed the decision all the way up to the chief of the entire
scientific analysis section. In the end, Williams forwarded a report
including the important caveat.23
Although David Williams had a clear penchant for slanting evi-
dence, prosecutors called him as their last witness. 24 They had
worked closely with Williams and relied upon him to summarize all
of the forensic evidence against the defendants.
Burmeister and my own expert had said that it was impossible to
identify the contents of the bomb. Nevertheless, the prosecutor
asked Williams if he could form any conclusions about the contents
of the bomb based on an inspection of the explosion rubble.25 Wil-
liams replied that he could identify the composition from the distri-
bution of the damage. 26 By looking at the destruction, he claimed
that he could narrow the type of bomb to fertilizer-based explo-
sives, including urea nitrate. 27 His conclusion was incomplete at
best.
On cross-examination, a lawyer asked Williams about the White-
hurst letter and elicited some startling admissions. Why had Wil-
liams altered the reports prepared by the chemists? 28
"It hampered the defense," Williams replied, apparently
serious.29
"So,... you encouraged Mr. Whitehurst... to go out of his way
to help the defense, is that what your testimony is?" 30
"That's correct." 31
21. See Bromwich, Investigation, supra note 15, at 50-51.
22. See Bromwich, Investigation, supra note 15, at 50-51; see also Trial Transcript,
supra note 12, at 7085-7105.
23. See Bromwich, Investigation, supra note 15, at 50-51; see also Trial Transcript,
supra note 12, at 7085-7105.
24. See Trial Transcript, supra note 12, at 7970.
25. See id. at 7973.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 7973-75.
28. See generally id. at 8080-83.
29. Id. at 8083.
30. Id. at 8085.
31. See Trial Transcript, supra note 12, at 8035.
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Williams went on to identify urea nitrate as the main charge of
the explosive.32 His identification was by no means a trivial one
because evidence linked the defendants to a bomb factory and
storage locker containing evidence of urea nitrate, an explosive
rarely used in a criminal device. On cross-examination, Williams's
testimony that the explosives were urea nitrates added credence to
the government's case without any basis in scientific fact.
Three years later, in April 1997, the Inspector General released
its report alleging corruption in the FBI laboratory... The report
found that large portions of David Williams's testimony were
either downright false or completely unsupported by scientific evi-
dence.34 Specifically, Williams had given invalid and misleading
opinions when he testified that he could narrow the type of bomb
by looking at the destruction.35 He subsequently asserted on cross-
examination that he could identify the main charge of the explo-
sion as urea nitrate, a speculation beyond his scientific expertise
and one that appeared tailored to provide the most incriminating
result.36 He later admitted to Inspector General investigators that
he could in no way determine the composition of the bomb from
independent evidence at the blast site.37 He stated that he made
the identification because he knew that agents had found urea ni-
trate at the storage locker.38 The report noted: "For Williams to
identify the main charge as urea nitrate based on evidence that the
defendants had or could make that compound is comparable to a
firearms expert identifying the caliber of a spent bullet based on
the mere fact that a suspect had a handgun of a particular
caliber. 39
How did well-intentioned prosecutors make the mistake of rely-
ing on a manifestly biased witness in the first place? They obvi-
ously believed that the defendants were guilty and that urea nitrate
was the explosive ingredient the defendants used. They sought out
evidence to support that opinion in the person of David Williams
32. See id. at 8035-36.
33. See Michael R. Bromwich, Inspector General, The FBI Laboratory One Year
Later: A Follow-Up to the Inspector General's April 1997 Report on FBI Laboratory
Practices and Alleged Misconduct in Explosives-Related and Other Cases (June, 1998)
(visited Feb. 20, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/fbillyr.htm> [hereinafter Bromwich,
One Year Later].
34. See Bromwich, Investigation, supra note 15, at 8, 10, 18-19, 24, 32, 38-42.
35. See id. at 55.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 40.
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and rejected Whitehurst and Burmeister's allegations apparently
because they contradicted that opinion. Naturally, Williams him-
self had been the first to fall into the confirming-evidence trap, ig-
noring the truth to justify his own belief that the defendants had
crafted their bomb out of materials the FBI had discovered.
How can people avoid falling into the confirming-evidence trap?
The authors of "The Hidden Traps in Decision Making" suggest
that decision-makers should consult with a "devil's advocate" when
contemplating their decisions.40 Importantly, trials can present
prosecutors with this opportunity. Prosecutors must present wit-
nesses to establish their case and defense counsel can probe the
weaknesses of their accounts. In this way, defense counsel prompts
the prosecution to examine all of the evidence with equal vigor,
rather than accepting confirming-evidence without question.
To be sure, the defense counsel in the World Trade Center case
did only an imperfect job in revealing the full extent of the wit-
ness's misrepresentations. Nevertheless, the trial presented an op-
portunity for the defense lawyers to air the issue of Williams's bias.
If our clients had pleaded guilty, we would not have had that
chance.
The questioning process that occurs in trials promotes better
prosecutorial decision-making not only in the cases at trial, but also
in future prosecutions. With repeated trials, prosecutors are more
likely to become skeptics of confirming-evidence in other areas of
their work as well. Because defense counsel has so little opportu-
nity to challenge confirming-evidence, plea bargaining is one area
in which prosecutors need to develop healthy skepticism. First, in
my experience, most prosecutors did not fully disclose the govern-
ment's evidence. Hence, I often found myself shadowboxing, try-
ing to strike a blow at a target whose identity was unknown to me.
They never produced live witnesses so I could not probe the credi-
bility of witnesses even when I knew their identities. These limita-
tions hobbled my efforts to argue persuasively against decisions the
prosecutor was considering. 41 At the same time, the limitations de-
nied the prosecutor the benefit of strong counter-arguments. Trials
40. Hammond et al., supra note 1, at 52.
41. For an informative discussion of the state of plea bargaining in federal court,
see Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117, 2128 (1998), in which Professor Lynch incisively describes the process as
an essentially ex parte affair run by prosecutors and law enforcement. While defense
counsel can make presentations to the prosecutor, the prosecutor and law enforce-
ment agencies function as a team, making the process neither neutral nor adversarial.
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are the best place for prosecutors to learn to build counter-argu-
ments themselves.
H. Anchoring the Case to the Wrong Man
Another example of flawed decision-making in this case oc-
curred when the prosecutors snared themselves in the anchoring
trap by clinging to their first impression of a witness's credibility at
the expense of everything else. Even before the trial began, ru-
mors circulated that someone could disprove the contention of my
client, that the van used in the explosion had been stolen from him
fourteen hours before the bomb exploded.42 Newspapers reported
that the government found a gas station attendant who said he
pumped gas for a yellow Ryder van driven by Mohammad
Salameh, my client, just a few hours before the blast and well after
he had reported it stolen.43
The prosecution provided us with FBI reports summarizing an
interview with gas station attendant Willie Moosh conducted soon
after my client's arrest. 4 According to the reports, the FBI
showed Moosh several sets of mug shots.45 In one set, he identified
the photograph of Salameh as one of his customers in the early
morning hours before the explosion. 46 In a second set, he identi-
fied another defendant named Abouhalima. 47 The other photo-
graphs in each set were of men who had no connection to the case.
The evidence seemed unassailable.
The prosecutor called Moosh to the stand, hoping that he would
discredit Salameh's story. In a case that had very few eyewitnesses,
the government was counting on Moosh to identify Abouhalima
and Salameh in court as the persons he had seen that night.
Moosh, a small, bespectacled man, settled into the witness chair
and smiled broadly at the judge. He nodded to us in the court-
room. A Spanish interpreter stood beside him. The prosecutor
asked preliminary questions to set the stage for the in-court identi-
fication.48 Moosh had worked as a gas station attendant at a Shell
station in Jersey City and had been on duty in the early morning
42. See Mary B.W. Tabor, Witnesses Report Seeing Suspects on Eve of Blast, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 1993, at B4.
43. See id.; see also Peg Tyre, Feds: Salameh Drove Bomb Van, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
Mar. 24, 1993, at 3.
44. FBI Reports on file with the author.
45. See Trial Transcript, supra note 12, at 5035-37.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 5035-37.
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hours of February 26, 1993. 49 Between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m., about
eight hours before the bomb exploded, a yellow Ryder van fol-
lowed by a Lincoln Sedan pulled into the station."0 Moosh related
how he had pumped gas for the two vehicles.5 The prosecutor
then asked Moosh to describe the occupants of the vehicles.52 He
testified the van's driver wore a closely cropped black beard, a de-
scription that generally matched Salameh's appearance in court,
and that a man with a "horse face" was in the passenger seat.53
Moosh said the person driving the Lincoln was husky and had red
hair, a description that generally matched Abouhalima's
appearance.5 4
Then came the crucial moment. The prosecutor wanted to prove
that it was Salameh and Abouhalima who had seen Moosh saw that
night. As the witness had recognized their photographs in the FBI
interview, the prosecutor had good reason to be optimistic. He
asked Moosh to look around the courtroom and see if he recog-
nized the man who drove the Lincoln.55 The atmosphere of the
courtroom suddenly seemed to change. As Richard Bernstein of
The New York Times described it, the trial took on the air of a
television quiz show when everybody in the audience knows the
right answer and waits in suspense for the contestant to respond. 6
Moosh left the stand and ventured toward the defense table. He
peered at the defendants. Then he looked beyond us to the press
benches in the back of the courtroom and looked over the report-
ers covering the trial.
"Look all over," the prosecutor urged.57
"Objection!" Abouhalima's counsel screamed.58
Moosh spun his head in the direction of the objection and looked
at the redheaded defendant. He skimmed the defense table again.
He glanced at the jury. He looked at me. Then he turned toward
the jury box. He appeared to fixate on it. Resolute now, he strode
up to the left side of the box and stopped six feet from the startled
jurors.
49. See id. at 4980-82.
50. See id. at 5038-39.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 5025.
54. See Trial Transcript, supra note 12, at 5025-38.
55. See id.
56. Richard Bernstein, Witness Fails to Identify Two Blast Defendants, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 1993, at B1.
57. Trial Transcript, supra note 12, at 5038.
58. Id.
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Moosh stared at Juror No. 6, a man with blond hair sitting in the
front row. He took one step toward him. Another juror, sitting
right behind him, began to wave his arms frantically.
Moosh raised his arm and pointed: "It was a person such as
this."59
"The record should reflect that he was pointing at Juror No. 6,"
Judge Duffy said.6°
Showing remarkable composure, the prosecutor told Moosh to
return to the stand and resumed his questioning as if nothing had
gone wrong. 61 He asked Moosh to identify the yellow van's
driver.62 Again, Moosh left the stand and repeated his movements
of a few minutes ago. He looked at the defendants. He looked at
me. He looked out at the. spectators. Then, like a heat-seeking
missile, he darted toward the jury box.
"It was a person like this one," Moosh said, pointing to a man
with a beard.63
"Indicating Juror No. 5," Judge Duffy said.64
The government asked for a sidebar conference and the lawyers
for both sides gathered around the judge. The defense argued un-
successfully that the damage Moosh's identification had inflicted
on the government's case warranted a mistrial.
"It was devastating," said one of the defense lawyers.65
"I don't think it's devastating unless I plan to indict Juror No. 6,"
the prosecutor replied.66
Over defense objections, the prosecutor obtained the judge's
permission to introduce into evidence the prior photographic iden-
tifications.67 In addition, he showed Moosh a single photograph of
Ramzi Yousef - a fugitive - whom Moosh identified as "horse
face."
The next day, during cross-examination, I showed Moosh the
particular set of six photographs from which he had selected
Salameh's picture in March and the day before.68 The five other
photographs were of people who had no connection to the case.
59. Trial Transcript, supra note 12, at 5035-37.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 5039.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 5024.
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"Now, this was the group of photographs which the FBI agent
showed you on that first day he came to your house, isn't it?" 69
Moosh looked at the photographs. "I don't remember very well,
but I think so. Yes, yes, yes. "70
"And you recognized the person you had seen in the newspaper,
didn't you?" 71
"Yes." 7
2
I now came to the main point I wanted to make to the jury. I
wanted him to admit that he recognized no one else in the group
from the newspapers. In this way, I hoped to suggest that Moosh
identified Salameh's photograph not because he saw him at the gas
station on February 26, 1993, but because Moosh saw Salameh's
picture in the newspapers after his arrest.
"Now sir, besides that person, do you recognize any other person
in those photographs having appeared in any newspaper or having
been on any television program," I asked.73
"I had not seen him on television, but I recognized this person
when it was shown to me here," he replied. 4
I just wanted him to say no, he recognized no one else, so that I
could leave the point. I rephrased the question: "Besides the per-
son that you recognized and who you say drove the van, do you
recognize any other people in that group of photographs? ' 75
Moosh confidently pointed to two of the pictures. "Horse face,
who's this one. And this guy, who was in back of the blue car."'76
The groans from the prosecution's table were audible. Moosh had
not mentioned until then anything about a person in the back seat
of the Lincoln. Moreover, the previous day he had identified the
picture of an entirely different man as "horse face" - Ramzi
Yousef - who looked nothing like the man in the photo spread.77
Most important of all, Moosh had identified two people with no
connection to the case.
Despite Moosh's failures to correctly identify the defendants, the
government argued in summation that his identifications were reli-
able, anchored, as it were, to their original position in the face of
69. Trial Transcript, supra note 12, at 5024.
70. Id. at 5025.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
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abundant evidence to the contrary.78 Two years later, however, at
the trial of Ramzi Yousef, prosecutors did not call Moosh to tes-
tify.79 Indeed, the government claimed that someone other than
Salameh drove the van that night.8 °
The Moosh episode illustrates the power of anchoring. The FBI
gave the prosecutors information about Moosh's ability to identify
the suspects. This information anchored the prosecutor's judgment
of Moosh's reliability. If Moosh identified the defendants initially,
then his subsequent misidentifications were simply mistakes. In re-
ality, Moosh's initial identification was the mistake.
How can people avoid the anchoring trap? Not surprisingly, the
authors of "The Hidden Traps in Decision Making" suggest that
decision-makers "[t]hink about the problem on their own before
consulting others."'" For prosecutors, this is no easy task, for the
first information they receive usually comes from law enforcement
agents on which prosecutors analyze the case. In that event, deci-
sion-makers should "[t]ry using alternative staring points... rather
than sticking with the first line of thought that occurs to them. '82
Trials may offer good places for prosecutors to view a problem
from different perspectives. The necessity of having to present wit-
nesses in court encourages prosecutors to question agents' ac-
counts. Even when this scrutiny fails to challenge the prosecutor's
first impressions, the visibility of the trial process - and the expec-
tation that counsel will be adversarial - encourages prosecutors to
entertain alternative starting points. Cross-examination allows de-
fense lawyers to flesh out those alternative views. Armed with evi-
dence of Moosh's cross-examination, I was able to argue more
persuasively that the jury should have a different starting point,
namely, that Moosh's initial identification was wrong.
In a plea negotiation setting, neither the prosecutors nor I would
have ever discovered the weakness of Moosh's identification. As
any defense lawyer will attest, prosecutors almost never let counsel
cross-examine government witnesses in the course of plea negotia-
tions. The prosecutors would have presented me with the FBI's
account of Mr. Moosh's initial identification and that would have
been the end of it. If I had asked the prosecutors to produce the
78. See id.
79. United States v. Yousef, No. S1293 Cr. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
80. See Benjamin Weiser, Driver Gets 240 Years in Prison for Bombing of Trade
Center, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1998, at B2.
81. Hammond et al., supra note 1, at 48.
82. Id.
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witness, let alone asked them to let me cross-examine him, I would
have been sent packing.
There are other reasons why plea negotiations are poor places
for prosecutors to examine evidence in a fresh light. Without hav-
ing to present agents as witnesses in court, prosecutors have little
incentive to challenge them. Equally important, it is exceedingly
difficult for defense counsel to break through the shell of intimacy
that pervades the relationship of prosecutor and law enforcement
agent to present a fully-fleshed alternative view of reality. As com-
mentators note, prosecutors and agents view themselves as part of
the same team.8 3 Defense counsel can make presentations to pros-
ecutors, but agents are almost always present, and they remain
present after counsel is dismissed. Counsel may feel constrained to
press the agents too hard for fear of offending them or the prosecu-
tor. Even if defense counsel wanted to, without the power of cross-
examination, counsel can only go so far in developing an alterna-
tive starting point for prosecutors. Thus, while it is important for
prosecutors to bring a spirit of open-mindedness to plea negotia-
tions to counteract the anchoring trap, the incestuousness of the
process discourages prosecutors from seriously entertaining
outside views.
The jury convicted all four defendants in the World Trade Center
case. My two stories might have been stronger if they showed in-
disputably that innocent individuals had been convicted as a result
of prosecutors falling into these traps. The examples do not show
anything that dramatic. At best, they illustrate how trials can re-
veal tricks of the mind that may adversely affect the quality of a
prosecutor's work.
Trials not only help prosecutors uncover and avoid traps in the
cases that go to trial. If they are sufficient in number, trials will also
help prosecutors avoid traps in the cases that end in guilty pleas. If
prosecutors repeatedly experience their assumptions challenged in
trial settings, they are likely to carry over those lessons into other
areas of their work. A prosecutor who repeatedly witnesses her
initial impressions being altered or even proven wrong at trial will
probably approach plea bargaining with more self-awareness. She
will be more likely to question herself. Is she gathering evidence to
make a smart choice or just looking for evidence to confirm her
initial impression? Has she anchored her view of the case without
83. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 41, at 2128.
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considering other viewpoints? The role of trial work as a tool for
improving prosecutorial judgment more generally should not be
underestimated.
Unfortunately, new prosecutors are getting drastically less trial
experience than their predecessors did. In the mid 1980s, assistants
in their first year in the Southern District of New York typically
tried three to seven cases..8 4 Assistants in their first year now try
only one or two cases - a sixty-six percent drop.85
Whether this drop in trial experience will erode the quality of
prosecutorial decision-making over time is difficult to predict. One
thing seems certain, though. If errors of judgment do increase,
without more trials, we will never discover them.
84. Deborah Pines, Drop in Criminal Cases in City's Federal Courts, N.Y. L.J., July
27, 1995, at 1.
85. See id.
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